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Does Aﬃ   rmative Action Reduce Eﬀ  ort Incentives?   
– A Contest Game Analysis
Abstract
This paper analyzes the incentive eﬀ  ects of aﬃ   rmative action in competitive envi-
ronments modeled as contest games. Competition is between heterogeneous players 
where heterogeneity might be due to past discrimination. Two policy options are 
analyzed that tackle the underlying asymmetry: Either it is ignored and the contes-
tants are treated equally, or aﬃ   rmative action is implemented which compensates 
discriminated players. It is shown in a simple two-player contest game that a trade-
oﬀ   between aﬃ   rmative action and high eﬀ  ort exertion does not exist. Instead, the 
implementation of aﬃ   rmative action fosters eﬀ  ort incentives. Similar results hold 
in the n-player contest as well as under imperfect information if the heterogeneity 
between contestants is moderate.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: C72, D63, I38, J78
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Aﬃrmative action can be described as a public policy instrument that should ameliorate the ad-
verse eﬀects of discrimination on aﬀected groups of individuals.1 However, the implementation
of aﬃrmative action programs frequently gives rise to intense public discussions. One of the
reasons for this controversy seems to be the fact that its implementation goes beyond formal
equal treatment considerations by addressing discriminated groups directly which is, for exam-
ple, reﬂected by phrases like ‘positive discrimination’, or ‘preferential treatment’ as synonyms
for aﬃrmative action. But even in contemporary societies in which formal equality is legally
guaranteed and enforced, there exists empirical evidence of ongoing discrimination with respect
to speciﬁc minority groups. Hence, although open discrimination is legally banned, some mi-
nority groups may be disadvantaged out of reasons for which they cannot be held ethically
responsible.2 In such cases in which formal ‘equal treatment of equals’-legislation is ineﬀective
because individuals are not ex-ante equal, the implementation of aﬃrmative action policies
could be justiﬁed on normative grounds; see Loury (1981) and Loury (2002).
However, opponents of aﬃrmative action do not only criticize the, from their perspective, formal
violation of the equal treatment principle but also they refer to potential adverse consequences
with respect to eﬀort incentives. The following statement by Thomas Sowell from his book
“Aﬃrmative Action Around the World” reﬂects this concern:
Both preferred and non-preferred groups can slacken their eﬀorts - the former because
working to their fullest capacity is unnecessary and the latter because working to their fullest
capacity can prove to be futile. [...] While aﬃrmative action policies are often thought of,
by advocates and critics alike, as a transfer of beneﬁts from one group to another, there
can also be net losses of beneﬁts when both groups do less than their best. What might
otherwise be a zero-sum game can thus become a negative-sum game. (Sowell (2004), p.
14)3
Hence, their might exist a trade-oﬀ between aﬃrmative action (i.e. preferential treatment) and
high eﬀort exertion due to potential disincentive eﬀects of those policies. This line of critique
1Discrimination is interpreted here as a disadvantage of a group of individuals in diﬀerent social contexts that
is based on some kind of exogenous marker, e.g. race, gender, or nationality, for which the members of these
groups are personally not responsible. Alternatively, more shortly and less technical, discrimination can be
described as “allowing racial identiﬁcation [or gender, nationality etc.] to have a place in an individual´s life
chances” (Arrows (1998), p. 91).
2This persistence of discrimination could, for instance, be interpreted as the consequence of historical
discrimination that aﬀects negatively the contemporaneous generation, e.g. if investment in human capi-
tal depends on the historical segregation of work and living places along races; see Lundberg and Startz
(1998) for a theoretical model.
3Similar incentive arguments have also been applied in the legal discussion, for instance, by Justice Thomas in
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4is also addressed in Fryer and Loury (2005a), ‘Myth No. 3’, where it is stated that “conﬁ-
dent a priori assertions about how aﬃrmative action aﬀects incentives are unfounded. Indeed,
economic theory provides little guidance” (ibid., p. 153 f). The contest game, that is intro-
duced in the next section, is an attempt to ﬁll this gap in theoretical analysis by analyzing
the incentive eﬀects of aﬃrmative action in the framework of a non-cooperative game between
competing agents. In this contest game the implementation of aﬃrmative action is modeled as
a biased contest rule4 where weak contestants are favored because ethical perception interprets
their weakness as being the consequence of past discrimination. The alternative perception, i.e.
holding the contestants ethically responsible for their heterogeneity, requires instead the imple-
mentation of an unbiased contest rule. Both policies are deﬁned normatively as (procedural)
restrictions with respect to the speciﬁcation of the contest rule which imply diﬀerent incentives
for the individuals depending on the implemented policy option. The key question is therefore
how individuals would react to the distortion of incentives that is induced by the two policies.
Contrary to Sowell´s prediction it is shown that in a two-player contest game the optimal indi-
vidual response to the implementation of aﬃrmative action is to increase individual eﬀort level
in comparison to the unbiased contest game (irrespective of the fact whether the individual
is discriminated or not). Hence, aﬃrmative action and high eﬀort exertion are not conﬂictive
objectives but rather complementary in this case. The reason for this result is intuitive: The
implementation of aﬃrmative action reduces discrimination related heterogeneity between indi-
viduals which results in a more balanced playing ﬁeld. This induces higher competitive pressure
which is directly translated into higher eﬀort exertion by both players.5
However, relaxing the restriction on the number of players is not innocuous: The result for the
two-player case can only be sustained in the n-player contest game if the underlying hetero-
geneity is not too severe because otherwise participation eﬀects dominate incentive eﬀects.
Hence, if participation levels are similar under both policies (a precise condition is provided in
4The underlying game theoretic model is an asymmetric contest game with heterogeneous players. Asymmetric
contest games are already mentioned in the seminal contribution by Tullock (1980), and are applied in
diﬀerent frameworks, for example, to analyze legal presumption in trials; see Bernardo et al. (2000), with the
interpretation of prior probabilities; see Corch´ on (2000), or in a two-stage rent-seeking contest; see Leininger
(1993).
5The result that favoring weak players in competitive situations can restore eﬃcient outcomes is also observed
in diﬀerent contexts, e.g. in international trade theory, see McAfee and McMillan (1989), rank-order tourna-
ments, see Lazear and Rosen (1981), or all-pay auctions with incomplete information, see Clark and Riis
(2000).
5the respective section) then the implementation of aﬃrmative action is eﬀort enhancing.
The contest model is formulated in general terms to reﬂect in a stylized way a variety of com-
petitive situations in which aﬃrmative action is implemented. Potential examples include,
for instance, admission to high school or prestigious university programs, bonus tournaments
within a ﬁrm, or even sport contests, where weak players are sometimes favored by the contest
rules. Along these lines there exists a limited number of studies that analyze the consequences
of aﬃrmative action. Fu (2006) models college admission as a two-player all-pay auction under
complete information and shows that favoring the discriminated player to some extent induces
the maximal expected academic eﬀort (interpreted as the expected test score) by both can-
didates. A similar conclusion is derived in Schotter and Weigelt (1992) who analyze, also
experimentally, a two-player tournament with unobservable eﬀort. However, those kind of
contributions do not specify the normative objective of aﬃrmative action, i.e. in these papers
aﬃrmative action is considered simply as a deviation from an unbiased ‘equal treatment’-policy.
This is a crucial diﬀerence to the contest model presented below because here the normative
objective of aﬃrmative action is explicitly deﬁned and integrated into the model.6 Additionally
all mentioned studies restrict their analysis to the two-player case. Extending the set-up to
more than two players might yield non-trivial results, as it is shown for the contest game as
presented here.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The contest game set up is introduced in the next
section. Moreover, the respective policy options are formally deﬁned and the corresponding
policy weights are derived. The two-player contest game is analyzed in section 3, and its
extension to more than two-players in section 4. Additionally, a speciﬁc example is provided to
clarify derived results. This example is generalized to the case of imperfect information by the
contest organizer in section 5. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
6In Fryer and Loury (2005b) a general equilibrium model with incomplete information is introduced where
contestants compete in simultaneous pair-wise tournaments. In this framework group-sighted and group-
blind aﬃrmative action policies are compared without addressing explicitly the incentive eﬀects of aﬃrmative
action versus unbiased tournament rules. For an empirical approach that also takes into account the reaction
of aﬀected individuals see Fryer et al. (2008).
62 The Model
Aﬃrmative action instruments are usually applied in situations of competitive social interaction.
The competitive structure of these situations can be captured by a contest game in which
contestants compete for an indivisible prize by exerting eﬀort. To clarify ideas the canonical
example of aﬃrmative action in university admissions is here brieﬂy interpreted as a contest
game. In the admission process applicants compete for a place in a university program based
on their grade point average (GPA). As the admission oﬃcer might also take into account other
personal characteristics, the outcome of the admission process will be probabilistic out of the
perspective of the applicants, i.e. an applicant that has a marginal higher GPA than all her
competitors for a speciﬁc place cannot be sure to be admitted with certainty. This feature is
captured by a probabilistic contest success function, formally introduced below, where GPA is
interpreted as individual eﬀort exertion.
An applicant that intends to achieve a high GPA to increase the probability of being accepted
faces a respectively higher disutility related with this attempt, i.e. obtaining good grades is
laborious and diﬀerent applicants might face diﬀerent disutility for comparable GPA levels. If
this heterogeneity can be traced back to reasons that lie beyond personal control (for instance,
minority students could be disadvantaged because they did not have access to high quality
schooling due to racial segregation of living places) then the implementation of aﬃrmative action
can be justiﬁed on normative grounds. In this case aﬃrmative action favors the disadvantaged
applicants in the admission process to achieve a level playing-ﬁeld.7 In the related contest game
contestants are disadvantaged in the sense that they face diﬀerent disutilities for exerting eﬀort,
i.e., achieving the same eﬀort level for disadvantaged contestants is more costly. Aﬃrmative
action compensates for this disadvantage and is modeled as an asymmetric contest rule that is
biased in favor of disadvantaged contestants.
As the contest model is suﬃciently general to capture diﬀerent competitive situations where
aﬃrmative action is applied, the formal set up will be based on the contest terminology instead
of addressing explicitly the university admission example.
7For instance, minority students that applied for admission to the College of Arts and Sciences at the University
of Michigan were granted a ﬁxed bonus of 20 (out of 150) points. Later, this type of aﬃrmative action policy
was ruled as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) because it
was not a ‘narrowly tailored’ instrument.
72.1 The Contestants
Let N = {1,2,...,n} denote the set of contestants that compete against each other for a prize
with ﬁxed value V . Each contestant i ∈ N exerts an eﬀort level ei ∈  + and takes the eﬀort level
of its rivals e−i =( e1,...,e i−1,e i+1,...,e n) ∈  n−1
+ as given. Contestants are heterogeneous
with respect to their respective ‘cost function’ that captures the disutility of exerting eﬀort.8 It
is assumed that this cost function is linear in ei and multiplicative in βi ∈ [1,∞) for all i ∈ N:9
ci(ei)=βi ei for all i ∈ N. (1)
This speciﬁcation implies that contestants can be ordered according to their marginal cost
parameter βi. The following order is assumed from now on to hold:
1=β1 ≤ β2 ≤ ...≤ βn.
The contestants perceive the outcome of the contest game as probabilistic. However, they can
inﬂuence the probability of winning by exerting eﬀort, i.e. the outcome depends on the vector
of eﬀort levels exerted by all individuals. The (potential) implementation of aﬃrmative action
is modeled as an asymmetric Contest Success Function (CSF), axiomatized in Clark and Riis










for all i ∈ N, (2)
with αP
i > 0 for all i ∈ N and r ∈ (0,1]. The parameter r measures the sensitivity of
the outcome of the contest game with respect to diﬀerences in eﬀort.10 Additionally, each
individual eﬀort level is weighted by a positive parameter αP
i that depends on the policy P,
8This heterogeneity might be the consequence of past discrimination. Moreover, the speciﬁed model is strate-
gically equivalent to a contest game where, for instance, valuations of the prize are diﬀerent among the
contestants. The assumption that contestants are heterogeneous with respect to their cost functions is there-
fore without loss of generality.
9The lower bound on the distribution of marginal cost parameters, i.e. β1 = 1, is made for analytical convenience
without aﬀecting results.
10The upper bound r ≤ 1 guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.
8formally deﬁned in the next subsection.11 If no contestant exerts positive eﬀort it is assumed
that none of the contestants receives the prize, i.e. pi(0,...,0) = 0 for all i ∈ N. Hence, the
expected utility function has the following form:
ui(ei,e −i)=pi(e)V − ci(ei) for all i ∈ N. (3)
2.2 The Policy Options
It is assumed that the choice of policy P is based on the normative perception of the hetero-
geneity of the contestants (i.e. the diﬀerent cost functions)12 which directly implies the norma-
tive objective of the respective policy option and therefore also governs the speciﬁcation of the
vector of individual eﬀort weights αP =( αP
1 ,...,α P
n). There are two potential interpretations
for the source of this heterogeneity that result in two alternative policies.
The ﬁrst interpretation holds the contestants ethically responsible for their respective cost
function which implies that the probability to win the contest game (i.e. the CSF) should
only depend on the vector of exerted eﬀort. In other words, if a contestant i exerts the same
eﬀort level as a contestant j then both contestants should win the contest game with the same
probability. This policy option would therefore treat the contestants equally with respect to
their exerted eﬀort level.
Deﬁnition 1 A policy is called equal treatment approach (ET) if:
ei = ej ⇒ pi(e)=pj(e) for all i  = j.
For the class of contest games as deﬁned by the CSF in eq. (2) equal treatment implies that
the policy weights (αET
1 ,...,α ET
n ) must be identical for all players:
αET
i =ˆ αET for all i ∈ N.
11Hence, in the terminology of Konrad (2002) the weighting factors that are speciﬁed by policy P alter the
‘productivity advantage’ of the respective contestants.
12As the base model is formulated under complete information, the individual levels of marginal cost are common
knowledge. An example with partial information is presented in section 5.
9The last equation is derived based on the hypothetical assumption that ei = ej and the deﬁnition
of the CSF as given in eq. (2). Hence, as already revealed by its name, all players will be treated
equally under policy ET.
Alternatively, policy ET could also be interpreted as an anonymity principle because it postu-
lates that the contest success function neither depends on the speciﬁc names nor on the exoge-
nous characteristics of the players. As the CSF is homogeneous of degree zero, the ET weights
do not have any strategic eﬀect on the contestants and could also be eliminated.13 However,
the outcome, i.e. expected equilibrium utility, of the contest game will indirectly depend on
the characteristics of the players because weaker players will exert less eﬀort in equilibrium.
The second interpretation is based on the perception that the contestants cannot be held eth-
ically responsible for their heterogeneity, for instance, because it is the consequence of past
discrimination. As heterogeneity aﬀects the cost function of each contestant, fairness would
require that two contestants that face equal disutility induced by the respectively chosen eﬀort
level (that could be diﬀerent) should win the contest game with the same probability. The
normative justiﬁcation for this interpretation is the “moral intuition that two people incurring
equal disutility deserve equal rewards”, see Kranich (1994), p. 178.14
Deﬁnition 2 A policy is called aﬃrmative action (AA) if:
ci(ei)=cj(ej) ⇒ pi(e)=pj(e) for all i  = j.
For the class of contest games as deﬁned by the CSF in eq. (2) the following relation with
respect to the policy weights (αAA
1 ,...,α AA










for all i  = j.
This relation can be derived by assuming that two contestants (i,j) choose eﬀort levels (ei,e j)
13In fact, in Skaperdas (1996), Theorem 2, the resulting CSF (speciﬁed by eq. (2) under policy ET) is axiomatized
based on a conventional anonymity axiom, compare also footnote 15.
14In Kranich (1994) this quotation justiﬁes a comparable normative restriction called ‘equal-division-for-equal-
work’ in the framework of a two-player joint production economy based on sharing rules. In his model
the interest is focused on the existence of eﬃcient sharing rules that satisfy this principle and not on the
their incentive eﬀects. Note also that in the model presented here the terminology ‘equal work’ should be
interpreted as equal disutility of eﬀort as this is the relevant normative standard of comparison if contestants
are not responsible for their diﬀerent marginal cost parameters.
10that induce identical disutility, βi ei = βj ej. This implies that ei =
βj
βiej. By Deﬁnition 2 the











. As the CSF is homogeneous of degree zero, there is no loss in generality if
the policy weights are normalized such that:
αAA
i = βr
i for all i ∈ N. (4)
Policy AA therefore generates a bias15 of the contest success function in favor of discriminated
contestants in such a way that both contestants have the same probability of winning the
contest whenever they face the same disutility of eﬀort. Note that this deﬁnition requires that
the aﬃrmative action bias is implemented multiplicatively through αAA
i which increases the
marginal eﬃciency of exerted eﬀort for contestant i and therefore changes the incentives for
eﬀort exertion.16
The deﬁnition of AA as presented here can be considered as a principle that guarantees a
notion of procedural fairness because it speciﬁes normatively how the contest rule should be
designed for speciﬁc (hypothetical) cases of chosen eﬀort level. This determines uniquely (up to
a multiplicative constant due to the fact that the CSF is homogenous of degree zero) the vector
of AA policy parameters. No consideration with respect to equilibrium behavior is needed for
this interpretation. However, based on the equilibrium analysis in section 3 and 4 it can be
shown that the AA policy also induces identical expected equilibrium utility for all players.17
Therefore, Deﬁnition 2 also satisﬁes an ‘end-state interpretation’ of aﬃrmative action because
it equalizes the expected outcome of the contest game. The normative argumentation for this
type of alternative fairness interpretation is straight forward: If the contestants are perceived to
be diﬀerent because they are discriminated (for which they cannot be held ethically responsible)
15In Clark and Riis (1998) it is argued that the anonymity axiom of Skaperdas (1996) should be relaxed because
“in many situations, however, contestants are treated diﬀerently (due to aﬃrmative action programs for
instance)” (Clark and Riis (1998), p. 201). The resulting CSF (axiomatized without anonymity axiom) has
the same functional form as in eq. (2). Hence, Deﬁnition 2 can also be interpreted as a substitute of the
anonymity axiom that entails now a speciﬁc normative restriction with respect to the asymmetry of the CSF
based on the underlying heterogeneity of the contestants.
16This type of multiplicative aﬃrmative action also has an interesting normative justiﬁcation in a decentralized
multi-contest situation, see Calsamiglia (2009). In this framework multiplicative aﬃrmative action is the only
policy that can equalize reward to eﬀort.
17Under policy AA all contestants choose equilibrium eﬀort levels that induce identical equilibrium disutility.
By Deﬁnition 2 this directly implies that in equilibrium also the probability to win the contest game must
be identical for all contestants. Hence, they all obtain identical expected utility in equilibrium. This result
holds for the two-player and also for the n-player contest game.
11then the contest rule should be speciﬁed such that the outcome coincides with a hypothetical
contest game where all contestants are de facto homogeneous.18 This implies that expected
utility in equilibrium should be identical for all contestants. The vector of policy weights as
speciﬁed in eq. (4) satisﬁes this requirement. Hence, Deﬁnition 2 is robust with respect to the
two presented alternative interpretations of normative fairness considerations.
In competitive situations in which aﬃrmative action is implemented eﬀort exertion can be
interpreted as being socially valuable.19 This is suggested by the fact that the incentive eﬀects
of those policies are considered in public discussions and legal disputes as mentioned in the
introduction. In the quotation of Sowell, for instance, less eﬀort of all participants is interpreted
as being socially inferior. As the focus of this study is the positive analysis of the incentive
eﬀects of aﬃrmative action, the two alternative policies ET and AA are compared based on a
measure of total eﬀort exertion, i.e. the sum of equilibrium eﬀort that each policy generates.20
As the equilibrium eﬀort level of each contestant will depend on the ex-ante announced policy





for P ∈{ ET,AA}. Additionally, the two policy options will be evaluated with respect to the
individual reactions of the contestants by comparing equilibrium eﬀort for individual contestants
under the two policy regimes.
The timing of the complete contest game can be summarized in the following way: The hetero-
geneity of the contestants (i.e. diﬀerent marginal cost parameters) is observed. Based on the
ethical perception of this observation a policy option P ∈{ ET,AA} is selected. The chosen
policy option determines the vector of weighting parameters αP =( αP
1 ,...,α P
n) for the re-
spective policy. Each contestant i ∈ N exerts the utility-maximizing eﬀort level e∗
i(P), taking
as given the eﬀort levels of their rivals and the relevant weights induced by policy P. In the
last step the exerted eﬀorts are observed and the winner of the contest game is determined
18This normative part hinges crucially on the assumption that there is only one source of heterogeneity for which
the contestants are either ethically responsible or not. In section 6 this assumption is relaxed in the sense
that there are two sources of heterogeneity where only one is normatively relevant.
19This interpretation of exerted eﬀort being socially valuable is the crucial diﬀerence to the extensive literature on
rent-seeking contests (compare Konrad (2009) for a recent survey). There, exerted eﬀort is usually interpreted
as pure social waste that should be minimized. However, there also exist studies in this literature where total
eﬀort should be maximized, e.g. Gradstein and Konrad (1999). In the recent literature on sport contests
eﬀort, i.e. the performance of the athletes, has a similar interpretation; see Szymanski (2003).
20The selection eﬀects that are generated by the implementation of aﬃrmative action policies are not in the
focus of this approach. Studies that address the selection eﬀects of aﬃrmative action are, for instance, Chan
and Eyster (2003), as well as Chan and Eyster (2009).
12according to the announced policy option. Finally, the total and individual equilibrium eﬀort
that is generated by each policy can be compared to shed lights on the induced incentive eﬀects
by the two policies.
3 The Two-Player Contest Game
Analyzing the two-player contest game is instructive in the sense that it provides the intuition
why contestants are induced to exert more eﬀort in equilibrium under the AA policy than under
the ET policy. Additionally, the incentive enhancing eﬀects of AA are (in contrast to the n-
player contest game) valid without any extra assumption and the equilibrium in the two-player
contest is characterized by simple ﬁrst order conditions. Therefore, the two-player and the
n-player contest game are analyzed in separate sections.











V − βiei for i =1 ,2;
where contestant 2 has a higher marginal cost parameter than contestant 1: β2 >β 1 =1 .B y
Deﬁnition 1 and 2 the bias for contestant 1 is normalized to αP
1 = 1 for P ∈{ ET,AA}. Solving
ﬁrst order conditions for a given policy parameter P yields the candidate for equilibrium eﬀort












i )2rV for i  = j, (5)








2 (β1β2)r(1 − r)
(αP
1 β2 + αP
2 β1)2 V> 0. (6)
A non-interior equilibrium in which a contestant exerts zero eﬀort cannot exist because there
always exists a proﬁtable deviation for one of the contestants.21 The second order conditions
21If both contestants would exert zero eﬀort a deviating player i will always win the contest with certainty by
exerting a slightly positive eﬀort level  : ui( ,0) >u i(0,0) = 0. If only one contestant j would exert zero
eﬀort player i can deviate proﬁtably by decreasing her chosen eﬀort level by a small amount   because then
she still wins the contest game with certainty: ui(ei −  ,0) >u i(ei,0) as long as ei −  >0.























i (r +1 )
 
< 0,
which proves concavity because the expression in brackets is negative while the ﬁrst expression
is positive. Hence, the equilibrium is interior and unique. From eq. (5) it can also be noted






= β2 for P ∈{ ET,AA}. (7)





i(P) that each policy generates. The following proposition
states the result for the two-player contest game: The aﬃrmative action policy as speciﬁed
in Deﬁnition 2 will induce higher individual and also higher aggregated eﬀort than the equal
treatment policy. Hence, in the two-player contest game as speciﬁed here a trade-oﬀ between
aﬃrmative action and aggregate eﬀort does not exist.
Proposition 1 In the two-player contest game (i) the sum of equilibrium eﬀort, and (ii) indi-
vidual equilibrium eﬀort level for both contestants is higher under policy AA than under policy
ET.
Proof : Using eq. (5) and Deﬁnition 1 and 2, the inequality E∗
AA >E ∗










β2 , which is always satisﬁed because it can be simpliﬁed to (1 − βr
2)2 > 0.
This establishes part (i) of the proposition.
Using the fact that the relation between the equilibrium eﬀort levels remains constant, as stated
in eq. (7), proves part (ii).
This result can be attributed to the fact that the implementation of the AA policy yields a
contest game that is more balanced with respect to the characteristics of the contestants (the
heterogeneity of the contestants is reduced by the biased CSF). As the contestants are more
similar under AA, the competitive pressure is higher which implies higher equilibrium eﬀort by
both contestants.
In fact, the bias that is induced by AA for the two-person contest game yields a level playing
14ﬁeld, i.e. the contestants are as similar as possible under this set-up. Therefore, policy AA
also generates the maximal aggregated eﬀort even for a contest game where the speciﬁcation
of the policy weights would not be restricted by any normative constraint. In other words, if
the objective would solely be the maximization of total equilibrium eﬀort by implementing an
appropriate weight ˆ α2 then this weight would coincide with the bias that is required by the AA
policy.22
Proposition 2 The policy option AA generates the maximal sum of equilibrium eﬀort in the
two-player contest game.
Proof : Consider the sum of equilibrium eﬀort for an arbitrary parameter α2 that favors the






β2 rV. This expression is maximized for ˆ α2 = βr
2
which coincides with αAA
i = βr
i for i =1 ,2.
The last two propositions reveal that in the above speciﬁed two-player contest there is neither
a trade-oﬀ between the AA policy and aggregated eﬀort nor individual eﬀort exertion as both
contestants will exert higher eﬀort levels in equilibrium if they face aﬃrmative action. In fact,
as it was shown in Proposition 2, the aﬃrmative action bias even leads to the highest possible
level of total equilibrium eﬀort under all possible policy weights that are in line with the CSF
speciﬁed in eq. (2). In the next section it is analyzed if these results are also valid for contest
games with more than two players.
4 The n-Player Contest Game
In the n-player contest game not all contestants will always actively participate in equilibrium,
i.e. some contestants might prefer to exert zero equilibrium eﬀort.23 Therefore the derivation
of the equilibrium and the proof of existence and uniqueness are more involved than in the
two-player case. Moreover, an additional assumption is needed in the n-player contest game to





. In this set-up, total equilibrium eﬀort is maximized if γ1 = γ2 = 0 and the
multiplicative parameters (α1,α 2) balance the heterogeneity of the valuations.
23This implies that the equilibrium in the n-player case might be non-interior and therefore cannot be character-
ized by ﬁrst-order conditions. The approach that is instead applied is based on the notion of ‘share functions’
as deﬁned in Cornes and Hartley (2005).
15guarantee the existence of closed form solutions: The subsequent analysis is therefore restricted
to linear CSFs with parameter r =1 . 24
The expected utility of contestant i in the n-player contest can be expressed as:
ui(ei,e −i)=
αP
i ei  
j∈N αP
j ej
V − βiei for all i ∈ N and for P ∈{ ET,AA}. (8)
The equilibrium of this contest game will be derived in the appendix, based on the observation
that the contest game can be interpreted as an aggregative game with its convenient properties.
The following equation provides an expression of equilibrium eﬀort for those m contestants of



























for all i ∈ M and P ∈{ ET,AA}. (9)
Set M =( 1 ,...,m) is indirectly deﬁned by the subsequent expression where m denotes the











for all i ∈ M and P ∈{ ET,AA}. (10)
Using the speciﬁcation of the weights for the AA and ET policy and the characterization of
the active set, the following lemma describes the set of participating contestants for each policy
option.
Lemma 1 Under policy ET the active set M ⊆ N of contestants is implicitly deﬁned by the
following expression where m is the maximum element of set N that satisﬁes the inequality
(m − 1)βi <
 
j∈M
βj for all i ∈ M. (11)
Under policy AA all contestants will be active.
24Cornes and Hartley (2005) provide existence results for non-linear CSFs with r  = 1 based on implicit equili-
brium characterizations. They also show that there might exist multiple equilibria which makes the derivation
of comparative static results intractable.
25The order of contestants in set M and N coincides, i.e. the contestants in set M are also ordered as an
increasing sequence with respect to their marginal cost parameter.
16As equilibrium eﬀort is given by eq. (9), the two policies can now be compared with respect




i(P) that they induce. However, Lemma
1 already reveals that the comparison between the two policy options will not be as straight
forward as in the two-player contest game because total equilibrium eﬀort depends on the
distribution of the cost parameter that determines the active set.
The following notation will simplify the characterization of the relevant distribution for a subset
J =( 1 ,...,j) ⊆ N of contestants: The arithmetic mean of the cost parameters of agents of set
J will be denoted as ¯ βJ = 1
j
 
i∈J βi (where ¯ β = ¯ βN to facilitate notation), and the harmonic











The subsequent proposition states the condition under which policy AA generates higher aggre-
gated eﬀort.
Proposition 3 In the n-player contest game the sum of equilibrium eﬀort levels is higher under


















ET = m−1  
i∈M βiV . Reformulating the inequality E∗
AA >E ∗
ET
leads to condition (12).
The following intuitive explanation is provided for condition (12) to hold which is afterwards
clariﬁed by a numerical example. As already observed in the two-player contest game, AA in
general induces higher competitive pressure because contestants are more similar than under
ET. Increasing the number of active contestants therefore yields higher total eﬀort for both
policies because this implies more intense competition. However, inducing heavily discriminated
contestants to participate comes at a non-negligible cost, especially for the AA policy, because
by Lemma 1 all participants will be active under AA. This eﬀect is less profound for ET
because highly discriminated contestant will not participate under ET.
Numerical Example: Consider the following contest game with three contestants that have
marginal costs of (β1,β 2,β 3)=( 1 ,2,2). The underlying dispersion is measured by the coeﬃcient
17of variation (deﬁned as CV = σ(β)/¯ β) which is in this case CV ≈ 0.2828. For these parameters
AA will generate E∗
AA ≈ 0.4444 that is higher than the aggregated eﬀort under ET which
is E∗
ET =0 .4. If a fourth contestant with β4 =2 .43 (which yields nearly the same level of
dispersion CV ≈ 0.2828) is added the diﬀerence between AA and ET becomes even more
profound: E∗
AA ≈ 0.4522 versus E∗
ET ≈ 0.4038 and E∗
AA − E∗
ET ≈ 0.0483. As expected, total
eﬀort is higher under both policies because the (active) fourth player contributes eﬀort as well
and induces more competition than in the 3-player contest. Moreover, this eﬀect is higher for
the AA policy. However, if the fourth contestant is highly discriminated (β4 = 10) this would
imply a decline of total eﬀort in the case of AA: E∗
AA ≈ 0.3938. This decline is less intense in
case of ET because here the fourth player will not participate, i.e. E∗
ET =0 .4 as in the 3-player
contest game. Comparing both values shows that for this four player constellation the result of
the policy analysis has been reversed because now E∗
AA <E ∗
ET.
This example demonstrates that the key factor for the outcome of the policy comparison is the
distribution of the discrimination parameter in combination with the number of contestants.
In general it can be stated that either a low number of contestants or a suﬃcient low dispersion
makes it more probable that AA will induce more total eﬀort than ET because then the set of
active contestants tends to be similar for both policies.26 The exact relation between the dis-
tribution of discrimination parameters and the number of players is described by the inequality
in Proposition 3 in combination with the characterization of the active set in eq. (10).27
Two additional remarks with respect to the relation between the results for the two-player and
the n-player contest should be in order at this point. First, Proposition 3 does not contain a
result with respect to the existence of a vector of policy weights that would maximize total
equilibrium eﬀort. This issue is a complex mathematical problem which is discussed in more
detail in section 6. Second, applying Proposition 3 to a two-player contest game with r =
1 would yield the same result as Proposition 1 because condition (12) holds irrespective of
26The observation that aﬃrmative action might imply a distortion of the participation decision of individuals
(which could ﬁnally dominate the eﬀect of increased competitive pressure) has also empirical relevance:
In an econometric analysis of bid preferences in highway procurement auctions Marion (2007) shows that
preferential treatment implies a decline in competitive pressure because some non-preferred bidders switched
to procurement auctions without bid preference program.
27Note, that the left hand side of condition (12) is lower than one for m small and larger than one for m large
where m is determined according to condition (10). Inspection of the right hand side reveals that it is always
lower or equal to one. This conﬁrms the qualitative statement that condition (12) is likely to hold if the
number of contestants is relatively small or the distribution is not too dispersed.
18the distribution of cost parameters in the two-player case: For policy options AA and ET
both contestants will exert positive equilibrium eﬀort, i.e. set M and N coincide. Therefore,
Proposition 3 is satisﬁed without further restriction because condition (12) can be reduced to
¯ β>β H
N which is always satisﬁed.
Due to the implicit formulation of individual equilibrium eﬀort (which depends on the active
set of contestants) a direct comparison of individual equilibrium eﬀort under both policies in
the n-player contest is only possible for given distributions of the cost parameters. Hence,
the additional assumption of full participation by all contestants under both policies shall be
considered to get further insights into individual equilibrium behavior. The assumption of full
participation would imply that the dispersion of cost parameters is suﬃciently low such that
also under policy ET all contestant would be active.
Although total equilibrium eﬀort for this case is higher under policy AA versus policy ET
(without any further conditions) as in the two-player case, the result with respect to individual
equilibrium eﬀort is diﬀerent: In the n-player contest game the set of contestants that individu-
ally exert higher equilibrium eﬀort under policy AA than under ET is restricted to contestants
with either very low marginal cost or higher than average marginal cost.
Proposition 4 If all contestants in the n-person contest game are active under policy ET,
then (i) the sum of equilibrium eﬀort levels is higher under policy AA, and (ii) the individual












as long as this set is non-empty, i.e. for distributions where















¯ β, ¯ β
 
the individual equilibrium eﬀort is identical under both
policies.
Proof : If all contestants are active then set M and N coincide, and condition (12) simpliﬁes to
¯ β>β H
N. This inequality is always satisﬁed which proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
For the second part the following inequality has to be analyzed: e∗
i(AA) >e ∗
i(ET). Simplifying














βj − (n − 1)βi)
⎞
⎠ > 0. (13)






, where the upper bound comes from the assumption












¯ β, ¯ β
 
. Continuity of the left hand side of eq. (13) in βi implies the condition for












could be empty. 
Proposition 4 states that there are two cut-oﬀ values of marginal cost parameters that partition
the set of contestants into three (or potentially two) subsets of contestants that react diﬀerently
to the implementation of policy AA. For contestants with higher than average cost parameter
the implementation of AA is eﬀort enhancing because they are favored under AA relatively
more than the other contestants. For contestants with intermediate cost parameters (lower
than average) policy AA is not beneﬁcial because they are favored relatively less than all
other contestants. Finally, for contestants with very low marginal cost parameters the eﬀect
of increased competitive pressure might come into play (if n − 1 < ¯ β) because their natural
advantage under policy ET is now reduced under policy AA. Hence, their optimal response is
to increase eﬀort exertion under policy AA.
The results derived so far are now clariﬁed based on an example of a n-player contest with binary
distribution of cost parameters, i.e., there are two groups with identical group members.28 The
simpliﬁed model presented here is also the starting point of the generalized model in the next
section where the informational requirements of the contest organizer are relaxed.
An Example
The set of n contestants is partitioned into two groups A and B that each consists of nA ≥ 2 and
nB ≥ 2 members. The members of each group are identical, i.e. they face the same marginal
cost parameter: βi = βA = 1 for all i ∈ A and βi = βB for all i ∈ B where βB > 1. In line with
section 2 the policy weighting factor are speciﬁed as: αET
i =ˆ αET and αAA
i = βi for all i ∈ N.
The active set under policy ET is determined in the following way (under policy AA all con-
28The implementation of aﬃrmative action policies is usually not based on individual characteristics, but on
group membership, e.g. minority, sex, race, etc. The reason for this grouped treatment might be incomplete
information with respect to individual discrimination (addressed in the next section), or simply the fact that
group members are suﬃciently homogeneous to treat them similar (addressed in this section).
20testants will be active): Denote the number of active contestants of group A by mA, and mB
for group B. Starting with the less discriminated group A, all members of A are active because
condition (10) reduces to 1 < mA
mA−1 which is trivially satisﬁed for all mA ≤ nA. Considering
group B, condition (10) becomes βB <
nA+mBβB
nA+mB−1 which can be simpliﬁed to βB < nA
nA−1. This
inequality does not depend on mB which implies that it either holds for all or for none of the
members of B. Hence, the following two cases are possible:
1. If βB < nA
nA−1 then both groups are active under ET.
2. Otherwise, only members of group A are active under ET.
For the two cases the aggregated equilibrium eﬀort level under policy AA and ET is now
compared. In case 1 all contestants are active which coincides with the special case considered
in Proposition 4. Hence, Proposition 4 can be applied directly to conclude that AA induces
higher aggregated eﬀort than ET. To compare individual equilibrium eﬀort condition (13)













as long as this interval is non-empty. This is the case if n − 1 < ¯ β which for
this example simpliﬁes to: βB > ((nA + nB)2 − 2nA)/nB − 1. Hence, if this last inequality is
satisﬁed all individuals will individually exert higher equilibrium eﬀort under AA. Otherwise,
only group B members will increase their individual eﬀort.
For case 2 Proposition 3 is applicable to compare the aggregated equilibrium eﬀort29 under
policy AA and ET. Condition (12) simpliﬁes here to the following expression:
βB <
nA(nA + nB − 1)
nA(nA + nB − 2) − nB
≡ β∗. (14)
The intuitive explanation for condition (12) to hold, as provided in the last section, is that
either the level of dispersion is suﬃciently low or the number of contestants is relatively small.
For the case considered here this can be veriﬁed explicitly based on eq. (14).30 In fact, it is
satisﬁed if either βB is low in comparison to β∗ (which coincides with low dispersion), or if nA
29The analysis of individual equilibrium eﬀort under the two policies is obvious in this case: Members of group
B trivially exert more eﬀort under policy AA (because they are not active under ET). This also implies that
members of group A exert individually less eﬀort under AA than under ET.
30It should also be noticed that condition (14) is not trivial in the sense that satisfying inequality βB <
nA
nA−1
would automatically imply condition (14). In fact, the opposite relation holds, i.e. β
∗ >
nA
nA−1. Hence, it is
possible that the sum of equilibrium eﬀort is higher under policy AA than under policy ET although not all
contestants are active.
21and nB are suﬃciently low (it can be checked that β∗ is decreasing in nA and nB).
Eq. (14) can also be used to show that the dispersion of the cost parameter becomes more
important with the fraction of discriminated group members: Denote the relative proportion
of discriminated contestants by γ = nB
nA.A s β∗ is decreasing in γ, a relative high proportion
of discriminated contestants implies a low β∗ which makes it less likely that condition (14) will
hold. In other words, if the group of discriminated contestants is relatively small it is more
probable that aggregated equilibrium is higher under AA.
5 A Contest Organizer with Partial Information
In this section the previous example is generalized by relaxing two assumptions: First, homo-
geneity within groups and, second, complete information of the contest organizer with respect to
individual characteristics of the contestants. Hence, contestants again face diﬀerent individual
marginal costs which is common knowledge among themselves but not for the contest organizer.
However, the contest organizer has, by assumption, information about the group membership




for group A and ¯ βB = 1
nB
 
j∈B βj for group B, respectively. Group B is assumed to be
disadvantaged on average: ¯ βB > ¯ βA.
For this framework the speciﬁcation of policy ET according to Deﬁnition 1 remains as before
(αET
i =ˆ αET for all i ∈ N) because it is deﬁned for all contestants identically. However, the
deﬁnition of aﬃrmative action has to be modiﬁed in this case because Deﬁnition 2 required
complete information of the contest organizer. Therefore the limited information of the contest
organizer has to be taken into account, i.e. aﬃrmative action policy weights must be based on
the average (group-speciﬁc) level of discrimination:
Deﬁnition 3 A policy is called aﬃrmative action (AA ) in a contest game with a partially
informed contest organizer if:
¯ βAei = ¯ βBej ⇒ pi(e)=pj(e) for i ∈ A,j ∈ B. (15)
The speciﬁcation of the vector of weighting parameters αAA 
=( αAA 
1 ,...,α AA 
n ) can be derived
22similarly as in Deﬁnition 2 which yields the following speciﬁcation of weights:
αAA 
i = ¯ βi for all i ∈{ A,B}. (16)
Hence, the contest organizer will specify only two diﬀerent weighting factors which is due to
the restricted knowledge that she faces.
An alternative interpretation of this limited information case would be to assume two sources
for the heterogeneity of the contestants: One source, for which the contestants are not held
responsible from a normative perspective (i.e. the discrimination of group B on average terms),
and a second individual source, for which the contestants are held ethically responsible, e.g.
the so called ´expensive tastes’. An example would be the following cost function: ci(ei)=
 ¯ βA + γi
 
ei if i ∈ A (analogously for i ∈ B) where the idiosyncratic (taste) parameter γi is
symmetrically distributed around zero with the restriction that |γi| < ¯ βA −1 to guarantee that
marginal costs are positive and larger than unity. The objective of aﬃrmative action is then
limited to balance solely the diﬀerence between ¯ βA and ¯ βB, which is due to discrimination
between the two groups, and not the individual diﬀerences due to taste parameters γi for all
i ∈ N.31
The comparison between policy ET and AA  is complex for this kind of set-up because not all
contestants will always be active under AA .32 However, a condition that guarantees higher
eﬀort exertion under AA  than under ET would depend (in a similar way like in Proposition 3)
on the number of active contestants under each policy option and on the underlying distribution
of marginal cost parameters in both groups.33
Focusing on the same case as in the last section where all contestants are active under both
policy options yields the following result:
31I thank Caterina Calsamiglia for suggesting this interpretation.
32Lemma 1 does not hold anymore in this framework.














where MP denotes the active set under policy P ∈{ ET,AA
 }. Note, that policy AA
  still balances (at least
to some extent) the underlying heterogeneity of the contestants which implies that (weakly) more agents
will be active under AA
  versus ET. Hence, the right-hand-side of the inequality will still be lower than
one. Making statements about the left-hand-side without knowing the exact distribution of the marginal cost
parameters is more diﬃcult because the order of active contestants in set MET and MAA might not coincide.
23Proposition 5 If all contestants are active under policy ET and AA  in a contest game with
a partially informed contest organizer, then (i) the sum of equilibrium eﬀort levels is higher
under AA  than under ET, and (ii) the individual equilibrium eﬀort of contestant i is higher
under AA  than under ET if and only if
βi < n
(n−1)
¯ βA ¯ β
(¯ β+¯ βA), for i ∈ A, or (17)
βi < n
(n−1)
¯ βB ¯ β
(¯ β+¯ βB), for i ∈ B. (18)
Proof : For the ﬁrst part the following inequality has to be analyzed: E∗
AA  >E ∗
ET. If all
contestants are active, this inequality can be reduced to nAnB(¯ βA − ¯ βB)2 > 0 which is always
satisﬁed by assumption.
For the second part the individual equilibrium eﬀort has to be compared. Starting with a mem-
ber of group A, the inequality e∗
i∈A(AA ) >e ∗
i∈A(ET) can be reduced to βi∈A <
(nA+nB)¯ βA ¯ β
(nA+nB−1)(¯ β+¯ βA)
with the analogous expression for members of group B.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 5 is intuitive because policy AA  levels the playing ﬁeld at least to
some extent: The discriminated group is favored on average such that the heterogeneity between
the groups is lower under AA  than under ET. This ameliorates the disincentive eﬀects due to
the diﬀerences in cost functions between the two groups. The assumption on full participation
implies then increased competitive pressure between the two groups which results in higher
total eﬀort exertion under policy AA’.
However, contrary to the full information case individual equilibrium eﬀort increases only for
those contestants whose marginal costs are below a speciﬁc cut-oﬀ parameter. The reason
is that under policy AA  the individual weighting factors are constant and not proportional
to the individual level of discrimination/marginal cost (as it was the case under policy AA
with a fully informed contest organizer). Therefore, policy AA  remains relative ineﬀective for
those contestants with a high level of discrimination. However, under AA  higher competitive
pressure between the groups still has incentive augmenting eﬀects for contestants with relatively
low marginal costs that will increase equilibrium eﬀort under AA  where the exact threshold
level is given by the two inequalities in Proposition 5.
246 Concluding Remarks
The implementation of aﬃrmative action policies is a controversial topic in public policy dis-
cussion. In particular the potential distortion of the incentive structure of competitive situation
is frequently criticized without providing well-founded theoretical arguments. The model pre-
sented here is an attempt to analyze this allegation based on a simple contest game framework.
The novelty of this approach is that it is at ﬁrst focused on a normative derivation of the ob-
jective of aﬃrmative action (which also determines its form of implementation) and secondly
on the positive analysis of its consequences. As the implementation of aﬃrmative action aﬀects
the way how eﬀorts are weighted in the contest game, contestants will react to this bias in
the contest rule. Hence, the consequences of the implementation of aﬃrmative action can be
analyzed with respect to the equilibrium eﬀort that this policy induces.
Using this approach it is shown that for the two-player contest game a trade-oﬀ between af-
ﬁrmative action and high eﬀort exertion does not exist and that both objectives are in fact
correlated. The result for the n-players case and the case with a partially informed contest
designer is more ambiguous: A trade-oﬀ between aﬃrmative action and high eﬀort exertion is
unlikely to exist if the participation decisions of the contestants are not altered substantively
through the implementation of the aﬃrmative action policy.
The existence of weighting factors that maximize total eﬀort is only addressed for the two
player case. The extension of this result to the n-player contest game is technically involved
for two reasons: The feasible set of policy weights is not compact and the objective function,
i.e. the sum of equilibrium eﬀort of all active players, might be non-smooth due to the fact
that contestants become active depending on the chosen weighting factors. This problem is
attacked in Franke et al. (2009) based on techniques from bi-level mathematical programming
with equilibrium constraints. It is shown that the vector of eﬀort maximizing weighting factors
exists and reduces the heterogeneity of contestants to some extent but not to the full extent
as in the two-player contest game (comp. Proposition 2). Hence, for more than two players
the optimal vector of weighting factors will be a mixture between the ET and the AA policy
which also takes into account the fact that inducing weak players to participate implies a
disincentivating eﬀect for contestants with relatively low marginal cost.
25Nevertheless, the general idea of how the implementation of aﬃrmative action aﬀects the in-
centives with respect to eﬀort exertion is straight-forward: Discrimination is a source of hetero-
geneity between individuals in competitive situations. The implementation of appropriate aﬃr-
mative action ameliorates (at least in the aggregate) this heterogeneity and makes individuals
more similar. This increases competitive pressure and therefore induces higher eﬀort by all
participants as long as participation decisions are not substantially aﬀected.34 A condition on
the distribution of the heterogeneous characteristics is provided that guarantees that the last
mentioned qualiﬁcation is satisﬁed.
A ﬁnal comment should be related to potential empirical validations of the derived results. With
the exception of bid preferences in public procurement auctions, see Marion (2007), suitable
data on these issues seems to be rather scarce.35 This suggests two approaches to address this
lack of empirical data: A ﬁrst approach is the analysis of similar competitive situation which
are governed by rules that balance the heterogeneity of competitors and where suﬃcient data
is available. Possible examples are sport contests that sometimes incorporate those kind of
balancing rules (e.g. in horse races, golf, or formula one races), although their implementation
is usually not motivated by normative concerns.36 A second potential approach is to conduct
experiments where the incentive eﬀects of aﬃrmative action policies can be analyzed in a
controlled environment like, for instance, in Calsamiglia et al. (2009).37 Both approaches are
work in progress and suggest (at a preliminary stage) that balancing the ex-ante heterogeneity
of participants does not have adverse incentive eﬀects which is in line with the theoretical results
derived from the contest model as provided here.
34This argumentation must not be restricted to the speciﬁc model of contest games considered here. Che and Gale
(2000) show for a two player set up that the eﬀort reducing eﬀect of asymmetries, the so called ‘preemption’
eﬀect, also exists for diﬀerence-form contests that include all-pay auctions as a special case.
35A recent exception is Hickman (2009) where aﬃrmative action in college admission is analyzed. This ap-
proach is based on an auction-theoretic framework and adresses also quota versus lump-sum policies are
counterfactually compared.
36An empirical analysis of amateur golf tournament in Franke (2010) suggests that performance in leveled
tournaments is signiﬁcantly higher than in unbalanced tournaments. Similar results are derived for profes-
sional tennis in Sunde (2009).
37In this experiment pairwise real eﬀort tournaments between school children are conducted where disadvantaged
children are favored by the tournament rules. Additionally, the incentive eﬀects of diﬀerent degrees and types
of aﬃrmative action instruments are addressed in this experimental study.
26Appendix: Equilibrium in the n-Player Contest Game
To construct the share function of contestant i, her expected utility function is transformed
such that the contest game can be interpreted as an aggregative game. The transformed utility
function of contestant i can be expressed as πi(zi,Z), where Z =
 
i∈N zi. The following
transformation is considered that is strategically equivalent to eq. (8): zi = αP
i ei, which can be
inverted to ei = zi/αP
i for all i ∈ N. The resulting transformed expected utility function for










i V and Z deﬁned as above. This transformed contest game is now covered by
the model in Cornes and Hartley (2005). The share function can therefore be constructed in







= 0 for zi ≥ 0. (20)
The best response z∗
i of player i can be expressed in terms of the aggregated equilibrium eﬀort:38
z∗
i (Z) = max{Z −δP





= max{1 − δP
i Z,0}. (21)
In equilibrium the aggregated eﬀort Z∗ is implicitly deﬁned by the condition that the individual





Theorem 1 in Cornes and Hartley (2005) states that a solution to this equation exists and
is unique by observing that the aggregated share function S(Z) is continuous and strictly
decreasing for positive Z, and that it has a value higher than one for Z suﬃciently small and
equal to zero for Z suﬃciently large.
38It should be obvious that best response- and also the share functions depend on the policy parameter P. But
as the ﬁnally implemented policy does not aﬀect the proof of equilibrium existence and uniqueness, it is
suppressed in this section for notational convenience.
27Equation (21) already indicates that contestants with a high level of δ might have an equilibrium
share of zero, i.e. they might prefer to stay non-active. Note that due to the deﬁnitions of
policies AA and ET the order of the contestants according to δP
i coincides39 for both policies
with the order based on marginal costs because δP
1 ≤ δP
2 ≤ ...≤ δP
n .
Based on this observation the set of active contestants M ⊆ N can be characterized, i.e. the m
players with strict positive share in equilibrium. From eq. (21) it is obvious that in equilibrium
Z∗ < 1/δP
i for all i ∈ M. Combining eq. (21) and (22) yields Z∗ = m−1  
j∈M δP
j
. The last two
expressions yield the condition that indirectly deﬁnes the set M ⊆ N of active contestants that






j for all i ∈ M and for P ∈{ ET,AA}. (23)
From the deﬁnition of the share function in eq. (21) the equilibrium eﬀort level of contestant i




i . Inserting the expression for Z∗ leads to
eq. (9).40
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